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MORE THAN MERE SEMANTICS: THE CASE FOR AN
EXPANSIVE DEFINITION OF PERSECUTION
IN SEXUAL MINORITY ASYLUM CLAIMS
G7,fonica ,Sxena*
In the case of gays, history and experience teach us that the
scarring comes not from poverty or powerlessness, but from
invisibility. It is the tainting of desire, it is the attribution of
perversity and shame to spontaneous bodily affection, it is the
prohibition of the expression of love, it is the denial of full
moral citizenship in society because you are what you are, that
impinges on the dignity and self-worth of a group.'
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INTRODUCTION
Until recently sexual minorities, those who identify as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgender, were invisible in modern refugee law. Facing
harassment, abuse, and torture because of the way they choose to love,
many sexual minorities are forced to flee their countries and seek refuge
in the United States. Sexual minority asylum is particularly curious be-
cause, while U.S. law increasingly recognizes claims by gays seeking
asylum based on anti-gay persecution, the American legal standards ap-
plicable to asylum are ill-equipped to deal with the unique challenge
faced by sexual minorities. Under U.S. laws, whether one qualifies for
asylum often pivots on the question of whether the persecutor intended
to harm the potential asylee.
This Article asserts that the requirement in U.S. asylum law that
requires an asylee to make a showing of persecutory intent is overly
and especially restrictive in claims made by sexual minorities. This Ar-
ticle proposes that the U.S. adopt the asylum standards of New
Zealand and Canada, where the focus is on the failure of government
protection as opposed to a focus on persecutory intent. Such standards
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are consistent with both the realities of persecution that sexual minori-
ties encounter and the original impetus behind the Refugee
Convention. Part I examines the different forms of persecution against
sexual minorities. Part II outlines the history of the Refugee Conven-
tion, including various political influences that suggest a liberal
interpretation of Convention standards. Part III discusses the current
split among the circuit courts regarding whether punitive intent is re-
quired to show persecution, and argues that requiring such a showing
is especially detrimental to sexual minority asylum claims. Part IV
proposes an alternative standard based on New Zealand and Canadian
law and argues that this standard more closely coincides with the
original meaning of international refugee law.
I. PERSECUTION OF SEXUAL MINORITIES: A WORLDWIDE PHENOMENON
Worldwide, countries punish homosexuality as a violation of cul-
ture, public health, or morality. Indeed, it was not until the spring of
2003 that the U.S. Supreme Court abolished a Texas prohibition that
criminalized same-sex sodomy. Abroad, the laws and punishments for
engaging in homosexual behavior can be much more severe than they
had been in the United States. The persecution of homosexuals falls into
three categories: (A) legally sanctioned persecution because of sexual
minority status in the form of case law, statutes, and codes that punish
based on sexual conduct; (B) mixed-motive persecution in which the
government persecutes sexual minorities for their sexuality but claims it
is for an unrelated ground; and (C) government silence or failure to pro-
tect individual rights in the face of private persecution of sexual
minorities.
A. Legally Sanctioned Persecution Because of Sexual Minority Status
The most extreme form of persecution of homosexuals occurs when
the government legislates the punishment of individuals for their sexual
lives. This can be in the form of laws against sodomy, legal prohibitions
against same-sex marriage, or laws criminalizing only female sexual mi-
norities.
2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Consider, for an example, Iran's laws and the case of Asylum Appli-
cant 29.' As a teenager, Applicant 29, an Iranian female, discovered she
was gay.' She started a secret affair with a fellow student.5 When her
partner's parents learned of the relationship, her partner was committed
to an institution and subjected to shock therapy treatments to cure her
of homosexuality. The two women subsequently fled Iran because the
punishment for a third conviction of homosexual behavior was death.7
The case of Applicant 29 is merely one example of a global phe-
nomenon of government-sanctioned violence against gays. Additional
examples further illustrate the problem:
* Cuba: Homosexuality is illegal for both sexes. Article
303-9 of the Penal Code allows for one year of impris-
onment for homosexuals who make "scandalous" displays
of public affection.'
* India: Male homosexuality is illegal and can result in a
sentence of life imprisonment.9
* Jamaica: Homosexuality is illegal for men under the Ja-
maican Penal Code. Convicted homosexuals can face up
to ten years of imprisonment.'°
Such sanctioned and encouraged punishment continues to be a re-
ality for many sexual minorities across the globe and often is not
recognized for what it is: persecution on account of sexuality.
B. Persecution by the Governmentfor Mixed Motives
Even when the government does not have explicit laws prohibiting
homosexuality, gays and lesbians are still susceptible to violence because
of their sexual orientation. Sometimes the government punishes the gay
man or woman for his or her sexuality under the pretext of another rea-
3. To protect asylum applicants from further torture, they are referred to by case num-






8. European Legal Network on Asylum, ELENA Research Paper on Sexual Orientation as
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son. This abuse, though not explicitly characterized as such, is often per-
secution because of the sexual minority status of the victims.
For example, in December 2000, Mexican prisoner and gay man
Luciano Rodriguez Linares was taken from his cell for a drug test.11 In-
stead of drawing blood with a syringe, officers put fingers in his anus to
draw blood.12 One officer told him, "If that's what you want, I'll give it
,,13
to you.
C. State Silence Equals Complicity in Persecution
In many situations, government silence in the face of private perse-
cution is akin to state-sanctioned persecution. For example, Italian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Rocco Buttiglione described homosexuality
as a sin, yet the Italian government did not sanction him in any way.4 In
the fall of 2004, Buttiglione was the leading candidate to become Italy's
Representative of Justice and Home Affairs to the European Commis-
sion. 5 In his confirmation hearings, Mr. Buttiglione said that if a
legislative proposal were contrary to his moral principles, he would op-
pose it.16 Only after much protest by gay and human rights groups did
Buttiglione withdraw himself from consideration for the nomination.1
7
Even though Buttiglione's nomination was ultimately unsuccessful, his
story underscores a larger problem faced by gays and lesbians living un-
der governments that do not affirmatively act in the face of such
discrimination: such an attitude allows free license to those seeking to
persecute gays and lesbians because they know the government will
likely not prosecute or punish them for their actions. 8
The persecution is intensified when sexual minorities seek govern-
ment protection and are further abused by government officials. When
Katya Ivanova went to a Russian police station in 1997, police sexually
11. Amnesty International Publications, supra note 1, at 30.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) Files, Homophobia, Reason wins
against homophobia at the European Commission (Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.ilga.org/
news-results.asp?FileCategory=9&ZoneID=4&FileID=362.
15. Head of European Panel Offers New Team, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at A7.
16. ILGA Files, supra note 14.
17. Id.
18. Amnesty International Publications supra note 1, at 6 (noting that "[o]fficial acquies-
cence allows LGBT violence to thrive"), 23-24 (discussing police brutality and
noting that "[w]hen the victim belongs, or is perceived to belong, to a marginalized
social group, officers are often able to act secure in the knowledge that their behav-
iour will not be investigated thoroughly, or indeed at all").
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harassed her when she tried to file a complaint against her neighbors
who assaulted her because she was gay.19 Over a period of months
Ivanova was repeatedly called to the police station to discuss her case,
and then raped. She feared more serious repercussions if she did not
comply, saying, "I pray that I am granted asylum so that my nightmare
can finally end.,
20
Government silence or retaliatory action in the face of continuing
abuse of sexual minorities is persecution and should be recognized as
such.
II. THE REFUGEE CONVENTION: HISTORY AND SUBSEQUENT STATE
PRACTICE SUGGEST A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION
OF ASYLUM LAW
The Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees was initially
drafted as a response to the overwhelming number of World War II
refugees. Its history and text, and subsequent state practices suggest that
the Convention was meant to be interpreted broadly and in response to
changing circumstances. 2' This section outlines the history of the Ge-
neva Convention, focuses on the political factors that were influential in
its drafting, and proposes that these same factors suggest a broad inter-
pretation of Convention protections because the Convention is modeled
on protecting individual rights. The section concludes with examples of
regional refugee agreements, modeled on the Geneva Convention, that
widen the category of protected individuals and show how these agree-
ments imply a wider understanding of what constitutes a cognizable
harm for granting asylum.
A. History
Article 1(A)(2) of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refu-
gees outlines the specific factors that must be established for refugee
status. The Article does not explicitly include sexual orientation, but the
historical influences underlying the Convention suggest that it should
be recognized as a protected category. The Convention applies to a per-
son who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
19. Id. at 23.
20. Id.
21. The U.N. Refugee Agency, The Wall Behind Which Refugees Can Shelter, REFUGEES,
2001, at 1, 11-12, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/
opendoc.pdf.id=3b5e9OeaO&tbl=MEDIA.
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of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country.,,22
Influences present in the drafting of the Convention can be traced
to the early twentieth century and suggest a certain political bias that
favors a broad interpretation. Europe, in particular, had a tradition of
welcoming immigrants who did not want to move to the New World,
because such individuals were seen as contributors to commerce and the
intellectual life of the native community.23 The concept of refugee only
became politically salient following the population displacements in the
aftermath of two major political upheavals: (1) the 1917 Russian Revo-
lution and subsequent civil war in which one million people fled Russia,
and (2) the Turkish government's efforts to ethnically cleanse the coun-
try of its two million Armenians during World War 1.2' Following these
major population displacements, both the U.S. and European govern-
ments realized that they would have to respond to forced relocation withS 21
normative standards, and thus began drafting the Geneva Convention.
B. The Western Influences Pervasive in the Drafting of the Geneva
Convention Suggest a Flexible Interpretation
of the Geneva Convention
Prior to the Geneva Convention, no international obligation ex-
isted to protect those who were denied state protection from their home26
governments. Because of this absence of obligation, many non-
European governments balked at assuming guardianship for individuals
who were not their legal responsibility.27 Over time, however, refugee
status began to be perceived as an individual right for a persons trying to
escape from injustice in or incompatibility with their home states
22. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 138,
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/refugees.htm.
23. M. MARRUS, THE UNWANTED: EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
6-7 (1985).
24. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 135-38 (1991).
25. Id.
26. JACQUES VERNANT, THE REFUGEE IN THE POST-WAR WORLD 14 (1953).
27. Id. (discussing how socialist states wanted to limit refugee status and make those
seeking what is not termed political asylum to seek refuge in states sympathetic to
their political views, whereas the Western world wanted asylum to be based on a per-
sonalized evaluation of whether a state was limiting an individual's freedom or
liberty).
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because of their beliefs or actions. 28 This specific Western-oriented con-
ceptualization informed the drafting of the Geneva Convention
insofar as refugee status was based on racial and religious human rights
violations that were common in the Eastern world, and not socio-
economic human rights violations which were more common in the
Western world.29
C. Textual Interpretations of the Convention and State Practices Suggest that
Refugee Status Should Be Granted for Persecution of Sexual Minorities
Regardless of the Intent to Punish
The same influence that pervaded the drafting of the Convention
in 1951 suggests granting asylum for sexual minority abuse regardless of
the intent to punish, because many actions such as sexual assault by po-
lice officers and laws criminalizing homosexual behavior are violations of
individual rights. It may be beyond the scope and spirit of the Conven-
tion to grant asylum for all forms of abuse against sexual minorities, but
refugee status should be given to those who suffer the most egregious
forms of abuse, or abuse that is deemed to be persecutory. The earlier
examples illustrate this point. °
Recommendation E of the Convention reads:
THE CONFERENCE, EXPRESSES the hope that the Con-
vention relating to the Status of Refugees will have value as an
example exceeding its contractual scope and that all nations
will be guided by it in granting so far as possible to person in
their territory as refugees and who would not be covered by
the terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it pro-
vides. 1
States have followed this mandate in two ways. First, acting in con-
cert with other U.N. member states, they have expanded the definitions
of the five protected categories to protect more forms of behavior, sug-
gesting that the grounds for asylum protection under the Geneva
28. Id.
29. HATHAWAY, supra note 24, at 5. Also because prior to the 1967 Protocol which re-
moved all geographical and temporal restrictions, refugee protection was only
available to those fleeing their homes from an event occurring in Europe: World War
II, the Convention is properly characterized as Eurocentric.
30. See discussion supra Part L.a.
31. Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
Refugees and Stateless Persons, 189 U.N.T.S. 37.
[Vol. 12:331
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Convention are flexible. For example, in 1977, U.N. member states at-
tempted to draft a convention on territorial asylum.32 Although they
were ultimately unable to reach consensus, there was an affirmative vote
among the 92 participating member states to expand the protection un-
der persecution for political opinion to include persecution incurred as a
result of opposing colonialism or apartheid." Moreover, there was con-
sensus that grounds for asylum should include persecution as a result of
foreign domination or alien occupation.34 The idea that persecution for
political opinion includes persecution for opposing colonialism or
apartheid is the same type of ideology that drove the expansion of perse-
cution of a particular social group to include persecution for
homosexuality.3 The consensus that asylum should be granted for alien
occupation or foreign domination suggests that the role ruling govern-
ments play in an individual's persecution is important. Following this
line of reasoning, persecution could be evaluated not using the intent to
punish, but the failure of state protection. This standard has been
adopted by other countries as discussed below.
States have also taken cues from Recommendation E when negoti-
ating regional refugee protection arrangements. The first such
arrangement was in 1969 by a group of African states collectively known
as the Organization of African Unity.36 The Organization drafted a con-
vention to address specific refugee problems among African nations and
adopted the Geneva Convention definition of refugee status, with a ca-
veat that included asylum regardless of the fear of persecution for man-
made disasters.37
A more recent convention adopted by ten Latin American states to
address those fleeing generalized violence and oppression also recognizes
that harm can be indeterminate. 38 The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on
Refugees gave refugee protection to those who ".... have fled their
32. Their efforts were a direct response to the Convention's failure to include any obliga-
tion beyond non-refoulment or the duty to avoid return of a refugee to a country
where the refugee faces a genuine risk of serious harm. See also R. Plender, Admission
for Refugees: Draft Convention on TerritorialAsylum, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 48 (1977)
(discussing that states insisted that they be able to retain their right to determine who
was granted admittance and who was allowed to permanently resettle within their
border).
33. Id.
34. HATHAWAY, supra note 24, at 13-15.
35. Id.
36. U.N.T.S. 14,691 entered into force June 20, 1974.
37. Id.
38. Organization of American States, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium
on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama,
available at http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/3452.pdf.
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country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflict, massive viola-
tions of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously
disturbed public order."39 As of 2005, more than half of Latin American
states have incorporated the expanded refugee definition of the Cart-
agena Declaration into their laws.40
These agreements are significant for two reasons. First, both agree-
ments were drafted in response to changing political and social
conditions. Increasingly, sexual minorities worldwide are a political and
social presence that advocates for equal rights. Their visibility may result
in both exposing sexual minority persecution that was previously hid-
den, and creating a backlash that hastens increased persecution against
sexual minorities. In either instance, the social conditions have changed
to such an extent that there is precedent for amending current asylum
protections to better address the needs of sexual minorities. Second,
both the African Unity Convention and the Cartagena Declaration em-
phasize the generalized nature of the harm instead of focusing on the
individual intent. Given the unique nature of persecution against sexual
minorities discussed earlier, and that these contemporary interpretations
of the Geneva Convention widen the category of who receives protec-
tion, some form of expanded protection (sans intent requirement) for
sexual minority persecution is requisite.
III. U.S. ASYLUM LAW: CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS
Current U.S. asylum law does not incorporate such an expanded
definition. As a result, a semantic conflict exists among the circuits re-
garding the definition, leaving many sexual minorities are left vulnerable
to continued persecution. This section outlines the general requirements
for asylum under U.S. law and then examines the historical develop-
ments in recognizing claims for refugee status based on sexual minority
persecution. Finally, it explores the current split among the circuit courts
as to whether an applicant trying to establish persecution must show
that his or her persecutor acted with punitive intent.
39. Id.
40. Norwegian Refugee Council, 20th anniversary of the Cartagena Declaration http://
www.nrc. no/Cartagena2004.htm.
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A. Who Qualifiesfor Refugee Status?
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), asylum is
granted at the discretion of the Attorney General. To qualify for asylum
a person first must meet the legal definition of a refugee.4 Section
101(a) (42) (A) INA defines a refugee as:
Any person who is outside of any country of such person's na-
tionality, or in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person habitually resided,
and who is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or perse-
cution.42
Neither gender nor sexual orientation is a statutorily designated
group in the INA. Thus, both women and sexual minorities attempt to
meet asylum requirements under the "particular social group" category.
What constitutes a particular social group? Because the INA has no spe-
cific definition of "particular social group", federal courts have looked to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BLA). The most influential decision
interpreting whether a person qualifies for asylum as a member of a par-
ticular social group is a 20-year-old BIA decision, Matter ofAcosta.43
In Matter of Acosta, the BIA held that particular social groups
shared a common immutable characteristic, stating:
The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex,
color or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a
shared past experience such as former military leadership or
land ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic
that will qualify under this construction remains to be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis. However, whatever the
common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one
that the members of the group either cannot change, or should
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988). This definition was first adopted by Congress in
the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1982) and restates the
definition from the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan.
31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
43. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BLA 1985).
44. Id. at 54.
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not be required to change because it is fundamental to their
45
individual identities or consciences.
The First, Third and Seventh Circuits subsequently adopted
Acosta's immutability test." In 1998, the Ninth Circuit adopted a
broader standard when it held that a particular social group could be
defined by either a voluntary associational relationship among group
members, or an innate characteristic fundamental to identities or char-
acteristics of its members.47 This broader definition, more favorable to
sexual minorities, is echoed in the Circuit's later asylum decisions.
1. Sexual Minorities and Asylum Law:
Getting in Because You Are Gay
The ability of sexual minorities to qualify for asylum under the par-
ticular social group category has been a relatively recent legal
phenomenon, and as gay rights expand in other areas, the time for a
broader definition of asylum is ripe. In Tobosco-Alfonso, a 1990 case, the
BIA upheld the grant of asylum to a Cuban gay man, and in doing so,
49
recognized Cuban gay men as a persecuted social group.
Fidel Armando Tobosco said that because he was gay, he was sen-
tenced to 60 days in a forced labor camp for missing one day of work.5"
Threatened that if he did not leave immediately he would have to serve
45. Id. at 54-55.
46. See Ananeh-Firemoong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that
pursuant to Acosta, family relations can be a particular social group); Fatin v. INS, 12
F.3d 1233 (3rdCir. 1993)(holding that pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the court was bound to ac-
cept the Acosta standard because the BIA definition was a permissible construction of
the Refugee Act and because Congress had not directly spoken to the issue); Lwin v.
INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing parents as a particular so-
cial group because they share a common immutable characteristic).
47. Compare Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that of central concern in determining particular social group was the presence of
"voluntary association") with Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th
Cir. 2000) ("We thus hold that a 'particular social group' is one united by a volun-
tary association, including a former association, or by an innate characteristic that is
so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that members either
cannot or should not be required to change it.")
48. See Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005) (considering both Sanchez-
Trujillo and Hernandez-Montiel and holding a family may constitute a particular so-
cial group for refugee status).
49. Int. Dec. 3222 (No. A-23-220-644) (BIA Mar. 12, 1990).
50. Matter of Tobosco-Alfonso, A-23220644 3/12/1990; 20 I & N. Dec. 819 (BIA
1990).
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four years in the penitentiary for being a homosexual, Tobosco was
forced to flee his native Cuba for the United States that very same day.5"
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued that homo-
sexuality should not be considered a particular social group because
recognition would give credence to socially deviant behavior and this
was not within the scope of the Refugee Act.52 The BIA rejected this
view and held that the INS had failed to show that homosexuality was
not an immutable trait."
Four years later, the INS reversed its position in Tobosco-Alfonso and
formally recognized sexual minorities as a particular social group."
Though the INS position represented a landmark change in asylum law,
it had little to no precedential or persuasive value in the U.S. federal
court system.55 Tobosco-Alfonso was limited to relevant circumstances,
and the INS never appealed the case at the circuit level. All of this
changed with a June 19, 1994, mandate by the Clinton Administration,
when Attorney General Janet Reno issued an order declaring that Tobo-
sco-Alfonso was to be considered precedent in all proceedings involving
the "same issue or issues.
56
Because asylum proceedings are confidential, it is difficult to esti-
mate with any precision the effect of Attorney General Reno's mandate.
News reports indicate, however, that more than sixty homosexuals filed
successful asylum claims in the two years following Reno's order.
57
Although Attorney General Reno's mandate can thus be considered
a victory for sexual minorities seeking asylum because of persecution
based on their sexuality, sexual minorities still face the legal hurdle of a
circuit split as to whether they must show their persecutors intended to
punish them. The U.S. Supreme Court will hopefully address this issue
in the near future, as it has weighed in on a number of pressing refugee




54. See Jennifer Warren, Asylum OK'd on Basis of Homosexuality, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25,
1994 at A3.
55. Brian F. Henes, Comment: The Origin and Consequences of Recognizing Homosexuals
as a "Particular Social Group"for Refugee Purposes, 8 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 377,
397 (1994).
56. Attorney General Order No. 1895-94, June 19, 1994.
57. William Branigin, Gays' Cases Help to Expand Immigration Rights: More than 60 Ho-
mosexuals Claiming Persecution Have Been GrantedAsylum in U.S., WASH. POST, Dec.
17, 1996 at Al.
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2. The Refugee Convention and U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
The Refugee Convention has given rise to some issues which have
been debated at length in U.S. courts and clarified the U.S. asylum
standard. One issue that is especially relevant to the present analysis is
what constitutes a well-founded fear of persecution.
B. Persecution: Early Definitions
In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court decided that both the victim's
subjective interpretation and the external objective factors were relevant
to the inquiry into what demonstrates a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion." Cardoza-Fonseca involved a thirty-eight-year-old Nicaraguan
woman who claimed asylum on the basis of her political opposition to
the Sandinistas." The Court held that, even if the actuality of persecu-
tion was one in ten, such statistics indicated a "well founded fear of
persecution" and as such, the focus of the test was on the applicant's
subjective beliefs. 60 Cardoza-Fonseca's mixed subjective-objective use is
relevant to sexual minority asylum claims because use of subjective, or
victim-interpretation, criteria suggests that even when a country's inten-
tion is not to persecute, such actions can still be deemed persecutory.
For example, as discussed in Part B of this section, sometimes countries
abuse homosexuals in order to cure them, not to punish them.
Cardoza-Fonseca was a precursor to Elias-Zacarias v. INS.6' In the
latter case, the Supreme Court elaborated on the subjective element of
the Cardoza-Fonseca persecution standard and inadvertently set the
62groundwork for the current circuit split regarding intent. In January
1987, eighteen-year-old Elias-Zacarias was at home with his parents in
Guatemala when two masked and armed men knocked at the door and
pressured Elias-Zacarias and his parents to join the anti-guerrilla revolu-
tionaries.13 When Elias-Zacarias and his parents refused, the guerrillas
58. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 450 (1987) (holding that a well-founded fear
is a fear that is both genuine and objectively reasonable. To be objectively reasonable,
there must be some reasonable possibility of persecution, but persecution does not
have to be more likely than not).
59. Id. at 424.
60. Id. at431.
61. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
62. Id.
63. Brief for Respondent at 1-2, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1990) (No. 90-
1342).
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warned that they would continue their harassment of the family.64 Fear-
ing for his safety, Elias-Zacarias fled his home and entered the United
666
States." He was immediately arrested upon his arrival.66
Both the immigration judge and the BIA denied Elias-Zacarias asy-
lum. 6 7 The BIA first concluded that the guerillas did not engage in
forced recruitment.6' Thus, the Board ruled that Elias-Zacarias was not
reasonable in thinking that the guerillas' statements that he should
"think [the guerrillas' recruitment offer] over well" and the guerrillas'
promises of continued threats were persecution. 69 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the guerrillas did practice forced recruitment, and
therefore Elias-Zacarias was reasonable in perceiving their statements as
threats.7 °
The INS appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that Elias-
Zacarias had failed to produce evidence of the state of mind of the guer-
rillas as required under the Convention, because his state of mind was
not relevant to the guerrillas' attempt to recruit him.71 In its brief to the
Court, INS argued that, "... where the applicant is punished for con-
duct without regard to his opinion, the punishment is for his act, not
his opinion. It is the motivation for imposing harm that distinguishes
persecution from all other forms of oppression., 72 In an amicus brief, the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) disagreed, and ar-
gued that the statutory language "on account of political opinion" only
required there be some nexus between the persecutors' political opinion
and the feared persecution, and that requiring a showing of the persecu-
tor's intent or state of mind went beyond the scope of the Convention. 73
The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the INS position. Writ-




67. See 502 U.S. 478; Elias-Zacarias v. U.S. INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cit. 1990).
68. 921 F.2d at 851.
69. 502 U.S. 478 at 480.
70. 921 F.2d 844 at 851-52.
71. Reply Brief for Petitioner, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1990) (No. 90-
1342).
72. Id.
73. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For
Refugees in Support of Respondent, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1990) (No.
90-1342) (noting, "Nowhere does the definition of 'refugee' or the established ana-
lytic framework for determining refugee status contemplate that a showing of
persecutorial intent is necessary to establish this nexus. Moreover, the conscious re-
fusal to join a guerrilla group is a political act that places an individual in opposition
to his recruiters and manifests an essentially political opinion.")
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did not require Elias-Zacarias to provide direct proof of the guerrillas'
motivations in threatening him because motive was a critical part of the
refugee definition, he must produce some evidence of his persecutors'
motive whether direct or circumstantial.74 Specifically, the Court held
that because the phrase "persecution on account of" referred to the
opinions held by the persecuted (and not the persecutor) Elias-Zacarias
had to show more than a generalized political motive in the guerrillas'
recruitment efforts. Instead, to establish persecution, Elias-Zacarias
would have to prove that he was being recruited for his political opin-
71
ions.
This mandate of the Supreme Court-that the persecutors' motive
is crucial to an asylum claim-has created much confusion within the
BIA and circuit courts. The Court was not explicit in delineating what
type of evidence is required to meet this standard.76 As a result, in inter-
preting the exact meaning of "persecute," circuits have split as to
whether the definition requires punitive intent or just a desire to hurt or
harm the applicant, not necessarily to punish. With regards to sexual
minorities, the question of whether punitive intent is required is espe-
cially pertinent because often the intent of the persecutor is difficult to
prove. This is for two reasons: first, the persecutor is most likely absent
from any asylum hearing, and second, as exhibited by the Linares situa-
tion where police officers sexually abused a gay man under the ruse of
drawing blood for a drug test, the persecutor can offer a non-protected
reason for their actions.
C The Circuit Split: Does Persecution Require Punitive Intent?
A leading Ninth Circuit case on this question of punitive intent ex-
emplifies why a broader standard is needed to adequately protect sexual
minorities. In 1992, thirty-five-year-old Alla Pitcherskaia, a Russian na-
tional, claimed asylum in United States.78 Pitcherskaia claimed that she
had been under Russian surveillance since the age of fourteen because
her father, an artist and political activist, had been arrested and jailed for
distributing anti-Communist literature. As she grew older, Pitcherskaia
was arrested three times, one of which was for failing to procure re-
74. 502 U.S. at 483-84.
75. Id. at 482
76. See Shayna S. Cook, Special Feature, Repairing the Legacy of INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 23
MIc H. J. INT'L L. 223 (2002).
77. See supra note 11, at 4.
78. Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1997).
79. Id. at 644.
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quired government permits for a gay-rights protest.0 Pitcherskaia's har-
assment by the government continued, including forced psychiatric
counseling to "cure" her of her homosexuality." About one year before
she left Russia, Pitcherskaia was arrested by the KGB and questioned
about her participation with Coming Out, a gay political organization
that advocated repealing a Russian statute criminalizing homosexual
sodomy.8 2 On a visit to the United States, after learning that one of her
former co-workers had been murdered by the Russian mafia, Pitcher-
skaia sought to remain in the United States.83
An immigration judge denied Pitcherskaia's application for asylum
and dismissed her appeal, finding that her fear of continued forced psy-
chiatric treatment sessions did not constitute persecution because the
government sought to cure her, not punish her.8
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Pitcherskaia argued that the Elias-
Zacarias motive requirement was binding on her case only insofar as
Pitcherskaia had to prove that the Russian government's actions were
undertaken on account of one of the five protected grounds in the Con-
vention.85 The Justice Department and the INS did not address the
Elias-Zacarias motive requirement, but did note that under Ninth Cir-
cuit precedent persecution was interpreted to require "unique
punishment," meaning punishment based on one of the five original
86Convention grounds. The Ninth Circuit held that the definition of
persecution was objective, and that although many asylum cases in-
volved persecutors with a subjective punitive or malignant intent, this
was not essential for a showing of persecution.1
7
In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit made two statements that are seem-
ingly curious in light of the Supreme Court's position in Elias-Zacarias.
First, the court states, "Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has
80. Petitioner's Reply Brief, Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997), 1996
WL 33418857.
81. 118 F.3d at 645.
82. Brief for Respondent at 9, Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997) (No.
95-70887), 1996 WL 33418857.
83. Id. at 12.
84. Id. at 18-19.
85. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5-6, Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997)
(No. 95-70887), 1996 WL 33418856.
86. Brief for Respondent at 23, Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997) (No.
95-70887), 1996 WL 33418857 (citing Abedini v. INS, 971 F.2d 188, 192 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1993)).
87. Pitcherskaia, 118 F.3d 641 at 647 ("We have defined persecution as the infliction of
suffering or harm upon those who differ in a way regarded as offensive," citing
Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1997)); Sagermark v. INS, 767 F.2d 645,
649 (9th Cir. 1985).
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construed the Act as imposing a requirement that the alien prove that
her persecutor was motivated by a desire to punish or inflict harm.,
88
The court cited a BIA decision in which a Togolese woman fleeing from
forced female genital mutilation was deemed a refugee despite her perse-
cutor's benevolent intentions.8' Also, the court noted that persecution is
objective in the sense that "it turns not on the subjective intent of the
persecutor, but rather on what a reasonable person would deem offen-
sive.
Why did the INS in Pitcherskaia not press the Elias-Zacarias motive
requirement? Is it because the Court did mean "on account of" to not
require punitive intent? One interpretation is that the holding of Elias-
Zacarias is not so broad as to require motive to punish, but only that
motive be shown insofar as there was intent to persecute based on one of
the five protected grounds.91 Such an interpretation would deflect the
persecution question away from intent and focus on the actual harm to
the persecuted person. This interpretation, however, has yet to be
adopted as the majority position in any jurisdiction. The consequence is
that sexual minorities are often left unprotected under the Convention.
Other circuits have adopted the INS position. The Fifth Circuit's
most recent elaboration of the Elias-Zacarias motivation standard was in
1994.92 In INS v. Faddoul, Elias Joseph Faddoul alleged that he was per-
secuted by the Saudi Arabian practice of jus sanguinis, granting
citizenship rights only to residents of Saudi Arabian ancestry.93 Specifi-
cally, Faddoul alleged that as a non-citizen living in Saudi Arabia he
would be unable to own property or businesses or attend certain
schools, and this constituted persecution. 9'
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the BINs denial of Mr. Faddoul's asylum
application and held that persecution required both a showing of the
infliction of harm and intent to punish on one of the five protected
Convention grounds.95 For sexual minorities, this is especially pertinent.
As discussed earlier, while sexual minorities may be abused because of
88. Sagermark, 767 F.2d at 646.
89. Id. (citing Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996)).
90. Id. at 647 (internal quotations omitted).
91. See Gustavo Tecun-Florian v. INS, 207 F.3d 1107 at 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (Fergu-
son, J., dissenting).
92. INS v. Faddoul, 37 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 1994).
93. Id. at 188.
94. Id. at 187.
95. Id. at 188 ("While the INS does not prove a precise definition of persecution, we
have construed the term as requiring a showing by the alien that harm or suffering
will be inflicted upon her in order to punish her for possessing a belief or characteris-
tic a persecutor sought to overcome" (citing Guevara v. Flores, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249
(5th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations marks omitted)).
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their sexuality, the specific intent to punish is not always present, as in
Pitcherskaia.
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a position in between that of the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits. In Sivaainkaran v. INS, the court ruled that an
asylum applicant could demonstrate persecution by a showing of either
the persecutor's motivation to punish or, more generally, the infliction of
harm for one of the five protected Convention grounds." Whether this
test requires a specific intent to punish is debatable.97 The specific use of
the term "punishment" suggests that, for the second requirement, "in-
fliction of harm" punitive intent is not required. Earlier Seventh Circuit
rulings offer some guidance on the question. In Osaghae v. INS, cited by
the Sivaainkaran court, punitive intent was explicitly required for a
showing of persecution.98 In contrast, Zalega v. INS,99 also cited in Sivaa-
inkaran, defined persecution as "the infliction of suffering or harm upon
those who differ (in race religion or political opinion) in a way regarded
as offensive." 00 The Seventh Circuit's definition comes from a 1970 case
in the Sixth Circuit, a jurisdiction that has yet to address the question of
punitive intent and uses the Webster's Dictionary definition of persecu-
tion.' °
Until the Supreme Court addresses the issue, many sexual minori-
ties remain vulnerable to deportation and continued persecution. In the
meantime, excepting the Ninth Circuit, the INS can invoke the Elias-
Zacarias punitive intent requirement in cases before not only the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits, but also in all other circuits that have not directly
addressed the question.
IV. AN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONTEXT
While the question of whether persecution requires punitive intent
remains unresolved, many sexual minorities remain vulnerable to perse-
cution and limited in their access to refugee protections under the
Convention. Other countries with more expansive definitions of
96. 972 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir. 1992).
97. See Robert C. Leiner, Note & Comment: A Flawed System Exposed- The Immigration
Adjudicatory System and Asylum frr Sexual Minorities, 58 U. MIAMi L. REv. 679, 689-
90 (2004) (proposing that Sivaainkaran's "infliction of harm" requirement refers to
punitive intent).
98. 942 F.2d 1160, 1163 (7th Cir. 1991).
99. 916 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1990).
100. Id. at 1260. (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id. (citing Berdo v. INS, 432 F.2d 824, 846-47 (6th Cir. 1970).
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persecution grant asylum to persecuted sexual minorities in accord with
the intent of Convention.
Two active refugee courts, the United Kingdom's House of Lords
and New Zealand's Refugee Status Appeals Authority, have established
that refugee status pivots on surrogacy, the failure of state protection.
1 2
This section focuses on international standards for granting asylum
and concludes with the suggestion that the U.S. adopt the New Zealand
and Canadian standards, under which the sufficiency or effectiveness of
state protection is the crucial factor in determining refugee status, be-
cause it is most in accord with the original impetus for the Refugee
Convention.
A. International Alternatives
1. Shah and Islam: Serious Harm and the Failure of
State Protection Constitute Persecution
Shah and Islam, a 1999 House of Lords ruling, is a benchmark case
in the legal development of the failure of state protection.' 3 The case
involved two Pakistani women who sought asylum in the United King-
dom.' °' The women claimed that because of false adultery charges, they
would be subject to both criminal proceedings and private violence if
they returned to Pakistan. ' °5 Pakistani law allows for death by stoning or
flogging for any woman found guilty of sexual immorality. A panel of
the House of Lords found both women met the definition of persecu-
tion under the Convention. °6 The House held that the violence the
women faced was layered.10 7 First, if forced to return to Pakistan, they
would face violence from their husbands.'0 8 The House defined this as a
quasi-private element.'09 The second aspect of persecution would be that
the women would not be able to seek protection from the state." In-
deed, they would be subject to state-imposed punishment, a more
102. Refugee Status Appeals Authority New Zealand, Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 at
53, available at http://www.refugeecaselaw.org.
103. R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shah; Islam v. Sec. of State for the
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public element of violence."1 Moreover, in the case of Mrs. Islam, the
House found that the legal and social conditions that existed in Pakistan
and left her unprotected against violence by men were discriminatory
against women. ' 12 For the purpose of the Convention, this discrimina-
tion was the critical element in the persecution. Thus the House held
that, while the state-imposed punishment was important, the failure of
state protection was pivotal in asylum analyses. The House ruled that
persecution comprised serious harm and the failure of state protection."
In asking the question, "Why won't the state protect you?" the Shah and
Islam standard shifts the focus of the asylum claim away from the intent
of the persecutor and towards the inaction of the state in protecting the
applicant from persecution.
On a practical level, this is logical and more in alignment with both
the original intent and subsequent interpretations of the Convention.
During asylum proceedings, the persecutor is not present. Thus, an asy-
lum judge must rely on the applicant's testimony and corroborating
evidence to determine why the persecutor acted the way he or she did.
Because of the nature of asylum claims, where most often the victims
have fled their home country, it is illogical to require such evidence. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to produce such evidence because applicants
are unable to bring it with them. Also, as discussed earlier, the Conven-
tion came from an understanding that asylum should be granted when
there is a violation of individual rights."4 Looking at the failure of state
protection focuses more on the effect on the victim and less on the per-
secutor's state of mind. Finally, regional refugee agreements modeled on
the Convention suggest a standard where asylum should be granted
based on political or social conditions of sexual minorities regardless of
the origin or intent of the persecution.
When considering the worldwide nature of discrimination based
on sexual orientation, the Shah and Islam standard is adequate to protect
many sexual minorities because it grants asylum protections where the
government affirmatively imposes punishment for sexuality. Although
Elias-Zacarias could also seemingly protect sexual minorities in this type
of situation, because evidence of the government's motives and intent
could be the black letter law, this is not the interpretation adopted by




114. See supra pp. 6-8.
115. See supra pp. 21-22.
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reasons, cannot get evidence of intent, or who face persecution by pri-
vate actors from whom the government fails to provide protection.
Ultimately, however, the Shah and Islam standard is under-protective.
Query what happens when the intent of the government is not explicit
in the form of anti-gay laws, or is not masquerading as some other legal
prohibition. This is where Shah and Islam does not go far enough to
protect sexual minorities. It leaves vulnerable the scores of sexual mi-
norities who are persecuted because they are gay; they are not eligible for
asylum because the government can offer a plausible alternative explana-
tion for their treatment.
2. Horvath: Persecution Equals the Unavailability of State Protection
A more recent House of Lords case clarified the Shah and Islam
standard and in doing so extended the protections afforded to sexual
minorities. In Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, a
gypsy claimed persecution by skinheads." 6 The court ruled that persecu-
tion, as understood in the Convention, "implied a failure by the state to
make protection available against the ill-treatment or violence which
had been suffered at the hands of the persecutors."' 7 The court later
noted that the failure of state protection is central to any asylum
claim. 118
Horvath's diction underscores a concern specific to the case of sex-
ual minorities. While the Horvath standard does broaden the parameters
of cognizable asylum claims, it is still not enough because the standard
pivots on the availability of state protection. Many times, especially for
the persecution of sexual minorities, even though state protection may
be available in theory, it is not a viable option in practice. The case of
Katya Ivanova," 9 discussed earlier, is only one example of many where
the availability of government protection is a mere faqade.
B. Shifting the Focus to the Sufficiency of State Protection
As illustrated above, for some cases of violence against sexual mi-
norities, both the Elias-Zacarias intent-based standard and weighing the
availability of the government protection are insufficient to fully address
the unique characteristics of gay persecution. Limiting the persecution
116. Horvath v. Sec. of State for the Home Dept., 3 ER 577, 1 (2001) 1 AC 489 (HL).
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id. (citing HATHAWAY, supra note 24, at 135).
119. See Amnesty International Publications supra note 1, at 23.
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inquiry to intent is not only ambiguous, but hinges the asylum claim on
evidence that is often unavailable. Using the Horvath standard is also
inadequate because it does not account for the situations where state
protection is available only in theory, not in practice.
To date, New Zealand and Canada are two countries that have
adopted the most progressive standards for determining persecution.
Both have adopted the two-tiered persecution standard first articulated
in Shah and Islam, but allow for a more expansive view of failure of state
protection by focusing on the effectiveness of such protection.
1. Persecution as a Result of Failure of Government Protection
In the New Zealand case of D. G. of Wellington v. Refiugee Status Ap-
peals Authority,12° the asylum applicant alleged that because of her
Chinese heritage, she was subjected to physical and verbal harassment
from native Indonesians. The New Zealand High Court held that the
appropriate benchmark for persecution was the seriousness of the harm,
and that under this test the actions against the applicant were not perse-
cution. Specifically, the Court defined persecution as "the sustained or
systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of
state protection. " 121 Unlike Horvath, there is no evaluation of the avail-
ability of state protection, but rather a more general inquiry into
whether the state protection worked. 1
2
In its more recent articulation in 2003, the Refugee Status Appeals
Authority reaffirmed the D.G. of Wellington standard and further em-
phasized the importance of the surrogacy principle in evaluating asylum
claims. Specifically, the Authority held that "central to the definition of
the term refugee is the concept of state protection, with the result that
the phrase 'being persecuted' must be interpreted within the wider
framework of the failure of state protection.' ' 123 The standard thus
sounds almost identical to that in Shah and Islam and Horvath. The
critical difference is that in Horvath, the threshold for evaluating surro-
gacy was whether a government protection system was available.
Consequently, under Horvath, even if asylum applicants have a well-
founded fear of persecution, the applicants can be returned to their
home country.
120. DG of Wellington v. Refugee Status Appeals Authority [2001] at 9, available at
http://www.refugeecaselaw.org (citing HATHAWAY, supra note 24, at 135).
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Refugee Status Appeals Authority New Zealand, Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03 at
51, available at http://www.refugeecaselaw.org.
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In contrast, the New Zealand Appeals Authority has held that a
failure of state protection is the baseline for granting asylum unless the
state protection system is sufficient to render the harm not serious or
well-founded.'24 The Supreme Court of Canada, in Canada (Attorney
General) v. Ward, similarly held that persecution includes situations
where the state tolerates the persecution of citizens or is unable to pro-
tect individuals from such behavior."
125
These two decisions recognize that the sufficiency of state protec-
tion is crucial. 26 Whereas under Horvath all that matters is the existence
of a state protection system. Thus, a pro-forma system that was not
really protective would prove fatal to an asylum claim. Neither Pitcher-
skaia's forced psychiatric counseling nor the sexual assaults of Katya
Ivanova and Luciano Linares would be deemed persecutory pursuant to
Horvath. Even though state protection in these cases was mostly ficti-
tious, the fact that it existed would satisfy Horvath. For sexual
minorities, the consequence of a more holistic asylum approach evaluat-
ing the effectiveness (New Zealand) or sufficiency (Canada) of state
protection can be monumental. This standard recognizes the reality of
persecution against sexual minorities and acknowledges that many state
protections for sexual minorities are merely symbolic.
2. Integrating the "Sufficiency" or "Effectiveness" State Protection
Standards into U.S. Asylum Law
The international asylum standard of looking at the sufficiency of
state protection is a better alternative to protect persecuted sexual mi-
norities than the current motivational requirement in a majority of U.S.
courts. Legal history, however, suggests that the adoption of such a stan-
dard seems unlikely. The American embrace of international law, and
specifically the Geneva Convention, has been uneven. 127 In the U.S. Su-
124. Refugee Status Appeal Authority New Zealand, Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 at 66,
available at www.refugeecaselaw.org ("In our view the proper approach to the ques-
tion for state protection is to inquire whether the protection available from the state
will reduce the risk of serious harm to below the level of well-foundedness, or as it in
understood in New Zealand, to below the level of a real chance of serious harm").
125. Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689, 715 (SC: Can).
126. The U.S. uses an adequacy of state protection standard, but this is only part of the
asylum refugee calculus. See In re R-A, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999). ("The
adequacy of state protection is obviously an essential inquiry in asylum cases. But its
bearing on the "on account of" test for refugee status depends on the facts of the case
and the context in which arises").
127. See, e.g., Richard Falks remarks on U.S. Nuclear Policy: "The U.S. has dismissed
international law-from the failure to observe the Geneva Conventions with respect to
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preme Court, the debate over the influence of international law has be-
come increasingly prominent as those who favor an internationalist
approach clash with those who believe such an influence will ultimately
dilute Constitutional protections.
28
Arguably, this idea of isolating American law is most pronounced
in the immigration context because of the very purpose of immigration
law-keeping a nation's borders intact. 129 Called the sovereignty princi-
ple, this theory suggests that domestic immigration law is the least
susceptible to the influence of international law because American gov-
ernment is founded on the principle of national sovereignty."O
Despite these concerns over maintaining a sovereign legal system,
the tension inherent in current U.S. asylum law cannot be ignored. As
the 2004 Lawrence v. Texas decision illustrates, the judiciary is open to
literally rewriting legal precedent and protecting sexual minorities under
prisoners in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib to the defiant attitude of the White House
with respect to recourse to wars of choice," available at wagingpeace.org/articles/
2004/06/00_ong-charting-new-course.htm.
128. Warren Richey, What influence international law has in US Courtrooms, THE CHRIs-
TIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 28, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
2005/0328/p02s02-usju.html ("Others warn that treaties may empower international
tribunals to take actions that change key areas of U.S. law. They say such changes
undermine the constitutional powers of Congress and the president, and erode other
government safeguards enacted by the founding fathers"). Compare Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 604 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[o]ver the course of
nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to foreign and international
law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of decency"), with id. at 624
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[m]ore fundamentally, however, the basic premise of the
Court's argument-that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world-ought to be rejected out of hand. In fact the Court itself does not believe it.
In many significant respects the laws from most other countries differ from our law-
including not only such explicit provisions of our Constitution as the right to jury
trial and grand jury indictment, but even many interpretations of the Constitution
prescribed by this Court itself"). See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, note 21
(2002) (Stevens, J.) In discussing whether the execution of mentally retarded indi-
viduals violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments the Court cited an amicus brief filed by the European Union ("More-
over, within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved").
129. See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889).
130. See Laura S. Adams, Divergence and the Dynamic Relationship between Domestic Immi-
gration Law and the International Human Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 983, 997 (2002)
(noting that "Yet, sovereignty is at its height in the immigration context. The plenary
power doctrine, which has been extensively criticized by scholars but not overturned
by the courts, give Congress virtually unlimited power to regulate immigration be-
cause that right is inherent in sovereignty. Indeed the power to exclude-and
therefore to regulate-aliens is a fundament attribute of sovereignty").
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the Equal Protection rubric. 3 Failure to extend such protection to sex-
ual minorities seeking asylum is not only hypocritical, it is antithetical
to America's historical and cultural commitment to providing a safe ha-
ven from oppressive government.
Inevitably, even if the U.S. were to adopt Wards'32 liberal suffi-
ciency of state protection standard, the U.S. asylum system might be
highly susceptible to jeopardizing the claims of persecuted sexual mi-
norities. In addition to the question of preserving Constitutional
protections, the potential for political backlash would be unpredictable.
Not only might the rights of sexual minorities be attacked, but the le-
gitimacy of both international law and the American legal system may
be called into question. First, international law in the United States may
be undermined, as those opposing equal rights attack the new interpre-
tations. Second, the judiciary itself would be vulnerable in such actions,
as its interpretation powers are usurped by Congressional legislation.'33
Such objections, though valid, do not foreshadow the fatality of a
realignment of U.S. asylum law to its international counterparts. First,
such criticisms can be leveled at any international influence on U.S.
laws. Reacting to criticism by refusing to change asylum law would be
both counterproductive and bad public policy because these concerns
will exist in perpetuity. Instead, the U.S. should reassess its sovereignty
in an increasingly interconnected world. Second, by deliberately ignor-
ing the unique challenges posed by sexual minorities seeking asylum, the
U.S. denies the most basic of human rights:
Lesbian and gay rights belong on the human rights agenda be-
cause if we tolerate the denial of rights to any minority, we
undermine the whole protective framework of human rights
by taking away its central plank-the equal rights and dignity
of all human beings. When governments ignore their respon-
sibility towards one sector of society, then no one's human
rights are safe.
34
131. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling the 1986 decision Bowers v. Hardwick which held
that there was no federal right to engage in sodomy and holding the correct question,
unasked in Bowers, was whether the right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
gives two consenting adults the right to engage in private conduct without govern-
ment interference).
132. Ward, supra note 125.
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MORE THAN MERE SEMANTICS
Ignoring the rights of sexual minorities makes all of society vulnerable to
human rights abuses.
CONCLUSION
The persecution faced by sexual minorities is unlike other forms of
persecution because it is often in disguise. Thus, the dilemma faced by
persecuted sexual minorities seeking refugee status in the U.S. is com-
plex. Not only must these individuals deal with the usual hurdles of
asylum law, but sexual minorities must also meet a motivational re-
quirement that fails to comprehend their unique status as persecuted
persons. Since the U.S. Supreme Court has not considered the issue,
whether persecutors must exhibit intent to punish or whether persecu-
tion can be established absent such a showing is an open question.
Currently, only asylum applicants in the Ninth Circuit are not required
to meet this often untenable legal requirement, a requirement which can
be acutely more difficult for sexual minorities because of the ambiguities
involved in proving the exact reason for abuse against them.
International law offers guidance to fairly evaluate the need for asy-
lum based on the unique characteristics of sexual minority persecution.
The surrogacy principle first articulated in Shah and Islam13  and subse-
quently clarified in Horvath'36 focuses on state protection, not the
individual act of the persecutor. Inquiring into the availability of state
protection, however, is not protective enough for sexual minorities. Of-
ten, even if state protection systems are available, they may only be
available in theory.
Of all the standards discussed, D.G. of Wellington"7 and Canada
(Attorney General) v. Ward'38 offer the most suitable protection for sexual
minorities because such protection recognizes that many state protection
systems are flawed and only offer protection in the abstract. More gen-
erally, unlike the U.S. standard, which requires a showing of the
persecutor's intent, the New Zealand and Canadian standards are more
fair to and protective of sexual minorities because often such intent is
difficult, if not impossible, to prove. The U.S. adoption of such a stan-
dard would be more protective of sexual minorities. This is in accord
with the original promise of refugee law and the exigencies of interna-
tional human rights. t
135. Supra note 103.
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